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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FUSTLER LODGE and STATE 
INS UPANCE FUND, 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants,) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and RAYEL JENSEN, 
} 
) 
} 
} 
Defendants-Respondents) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case is an appeal from an order by the Industrial 
Co~ission reversing the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order of the Administrative Law Judge. 
DISPOSITION BY TilE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the applicant 
was not entitled to Horkmens Compensation benefits as against the 
Rustler Lodge and its insurance carrier, State Insurance Fund. 
This ruling was reversed by the Industrial Commission which held 
mat the applicant was an employee of Rustler Lodge, rather than 
m independent contractor, as required by 35-1-42, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the order made 
by the Industrial Commission and an affirmation of the order of 
the Administrative Law Judge. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
As used herein, "Tr." followed by a number refers to 
the transcript of the Industrial Commission hearing and its page 
number. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The applicant herein, on June 21, 1974, tripped and 
fell on a stairway lvhile working at the Rustler Lodge at Alta, 
Utah. (Tr. 15) His left shoulder 'N"as dislocated and his right 
knee was injured to an extent requiring surgery. (Tr. 15, 16 
and 18) 
At the time, applicant was a skilled drywall applicator 
who generally operates a business with an associate, David Wagstaff, 
under the name Triangle Dry 'tlall. (Tr. 3, 4) The first contact 
made by the manager of the Lodge, to get this particular job done, 
was with the applicant's associate, Hr. Wagstaff. (Tr. 5) It was 
indicated that Triangle was probably not interested, as a company, 
in the job, but the applicant himself might handle it. The manager 
contacted Mr. Jensen. (Tr. 6 and 34) After this point, Mr. Larry 
Thompson handled the negotiations and arrangements on behalf of 
the Lodge. (Tr. 6) 
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The job in question consisted of applying some sheetrock 
in a storage area and in the ceiling of a conference room. (Tr. 7) 
The applicant made several inspection trips to the Lodge in order 
to estimate the materials necessary for the job, etc. (Tr. ll) 
Applicant was to furnish said materials but they were to be paid 
for by the Lodge. (Tr. 34) It was also decided that applicant 
v10uld be paid $8.00 per hour. (Tr. 34) 
The applicant furnished all the specialized tools involved 
in the job, while the Lodge furnished a visqueen drop cloth for the 
floor and a ladder. (Tr. 24, 25) 
The Lodge is in the lodging and restaurant business. It 
hires the usual staff of cooks, waitresses, bus boys, etc. It 
has an ancillary activity of maintenance which requires a maintenance 
and handy man crew, but the Lodge routinely hires outside help 
for repairs requiring skilled services, such as electricians, 
plumbers, etc. (Tr. 33 and 36) There appears to be no controversy 
mat the job in question required a skill not possessed by the usual 
maintenance crews. (Tr. 27 and 39) 
ARGUMENT 
It should be clearly understood at the outset that the 
facts of this case are not really questioned by either side. The 
issue herein is largely one of establishing all the facts, then 
weighing them to see which of the possible legal conclusions is 
best sustained by those facts. 
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Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 113 U. 504, 196 
P.2d 718, (1948) is a case very similar to this one. In that case 
the owner of a building engaged the plaintiff and another individu, 
to make repairs to the building. Plaintiff was injured and sou~t 
compensation. The Inuustrial Commission denied compensation and 
that denial was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court said, 
at 719: 
The question of whether or not one 
engaged in a service for another is an employee 
or an independent contractor, within the meaning 
of the tiTorkmen' s Compensation Act, is a juris-
dictional qu;stion, presenting a situation 
which require'S this court to determine the 
status from the facts submitted, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. But where, as here, 
the evidence in the case is largely uncontra-
dicted, the problem is not so much one of 
examining the record to determine whether the 
evidence preponderates for or against the 
conclusion of the commission, but rather of 
determining whether the commission drew the 
correct legal conclusion therefrom. 
(Citations omitted) 
The Court went on to point out that the defendant owned 
and operated a coffee shop. The defendant also owned the building 
in question. The defendant gave an explanation as to what work 
was wanted. It was agreed that the defendant would furnish the 
materials and pay the carpenter's union scale wage of $1.50 per 
hour. In the course of the repair work plaintiff's eye was injured. 
POINT I. 
THE Tt/ORK DONE BY APPLICANT \vAS NOT IN THE USUAL 
COURSE OF BUSINESS CARRIED ON BY RUSTLER LODGE 
AS REQUIRED BY 35-l-42, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
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Factually Sommerville, supra. is distinguishable from 
our case because the building repaired was separate from the coffee 
shop. It was felt, therefore, that the repair work could not be 
considered a part of defendant's "usual course" of business. The 
language cited as well as certain facts given are helpful in the 
present case, and will be discussed below. 
The issue of what constitutes the nature of a business 
was discussed in Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., 63 u. 551, 
228 P. 184, (1924). There defendant ranch had employed a carpenter 
to build a home as residence for its foreman or manager. The 
carpenter was injured not while working on the house, but while 
momentarily helping other ranch hands to carry groceries. The 
Court said, at 186: 
In a narrow and restricted view of the 
transaction, plaintiff at the very moment of 
his injury was an agricultural laborer. He 
was assisting farm laborers in moving boxes 
containing groceries for use on the farm. In 
the broader sense he was a carpenter's helper, 
for that was the work he had been doing all the 
time from the date of his employment down to 
the moment he stepped aside, at the request 
of his employer, to assist in removing the 
boxes. We are not inclined to dispose of the 
case upon the narrow view above referred to. 
The Court then went on to say that the "general and usual" 
business of the employer was agriculture and not building construction. 
Applying this case to our facts, the Commission, in the 
order reversing the Administrative Law Judge said that the fact that 
the applicant was hired as a skilled drywall applicator did not 
alter the maintenance situation. Apparently, the Commission felt 
that the applicant's work was in the nature of maintenance. If 
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that is true, why was it that the maintenance crew, regularly 
hired by the Lodge, was not asked to do the job in question? 
The answer is obvious. That crew lacked the skill, material and 
tools to accomplish the task. They did not have these items because 
the "usual course of the business" was restaurant and overnig;:. 
accommodations with some ancillary maintenance work. The job 
required something dehors the usual scope of work carried on at 
the Lodge. 
POINT II. 
THE LODGE DID NOT SUPERVISE AND CONTROL THE HORK. 
Referring to the Sommerville case, supra., it was stated 
therein, at 720: 
[3] It is now well settled in the 
jurisdiction that the crucial factor in 
determining whether an applicant for 
workmen's compensation is an employee or 
an independent contractor is whether or 
not the person for whom the services were 
performed had the right to control the 
execution of the work. 
On many occasions various factors have been discussed 
as aids in establishing what is meant by "right to control" work. 
At least two Utah cases adopt the position taken by the Restatement 
of the Law of Agency, § 220. See Sutton v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 344 P.2d 538, (1959); and Christean v. Industrial CommissiJ.l!'l: 
113 U. 451, 196 P.2d 502, (1948). 
Christean, supra., at 505, quotes from the Restatement: \ 
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"(2) In determining whether one acting for 
another is.a servant or an independent contractor, 
the followlng matters of fact, among others, are 
considered: 
"a. The extent of control 1¥hich, by 
the agreement, the master may exercise over the 
details of the work; 
"b. whether or not the employed is 
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
"c. the kind of occupation, with refer-
ence to whether, in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the employer 
or by a specialist without supervision; 
"d. the skill required in the particular 
occupation; 
"e. whether the employer or the work-
man supplied the instrumentalities, tools, and 
the place of work for the person doing the work; 
"f. the length of time for which the 
person is employed; 
"g. the method of payment, whether by 
the time or by the job; 
"h. whether or not the work is a part 
of the regular business of the employer; and 
"i. whether or not the parties believe 
they are creating the relationship of master 
and servant." 
Since no express agreement seemed to exist between the 
parties subdivision a. above will be discussed later under the intent 
of the parties. 
Beginning with subdivision b., it is obvious from the 
discussion above that the general business of the Lodge, including 
its maintenance requirements, is distinct from that of the applicant 
herein. The applicant testified that the patching and texturing 
required on this job was an art, (Tr. 26) and that he was hired 
for his skill at this particular art, a skill he had attained 
from 21 years of experience. (Tr. 27) This indicates the distinction 
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"contracting" rather than entering into a master servant relation-
ship. (Tr. 37) Further, the Lodge took advice from people in 
similar circumstances, (Tr. 39) and they took advice from the 
applicant. (Tr. 36) Finally, the manager testified that when he 
hires professional help, such as electricians, plumbers, etc. that 
he does not consider them employees, nor does he withhold taxes, 
even when he does pay them by the hour. (Tr. 42-43) 
CONCLUSION 
It can be seen by following a step by step process 
through the Restatement that in every instance, the evidence 
preponderates against finding a master-servant relationship in 
this case. As a result, no compensation can be paid to the applica:.: 
because he \vas not an employee or servant as required by 35-1-42, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It is respectfully submitted that ilie 
Industrial Commission misconstrued the facts herein. As a result 
the wrong legal conclusion was drawn. The Commission should be 
reversed and the order of the Administrative Law Judge should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this _____ day of August, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. !100RE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Rawlings, Roberts & Black 
400 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
328-9741 
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